Via Armchair Generalist, comes a piece from Stephen Biddle in which he makes the face meltingly obvious, yet for some reason controversial, point that war is influenced by domestic politics (just ignore the fact that he’s citing one of Bob Woodward’s always dubious “quotes”):
Bob Woodward’s new book, Obama’s Wars, quotes the president expressing concern about the domestic political implications of military strategy in Afghanistan: “I can’t lose the whole Democratic Party,” he tells Sen. Lindsey Graham in defending his decision to announce July 2011 as the date for the beginning of U.S. troop withdrawals. Some have denounced this as evidence that the president is endangering the nation by putting politics ahead of military necessity. Former U.S. ambassador to the United Nations John Bolton, for example, described the president’s quote as “some of the most cold-blooded, cynical, grotesquely political manipulation of national security that I think we’ve ever seen.”
Like most of Washington, I haven’t read the book yet. So I don’t know the full context of the quote. But I do know that it’s no sin for a president to consider the domestic politics of military strategy. On the contrary, he has to. It’s a central part of his job as commander in chief.
First of all, being called “cold-blooded” and “grotesquely political” by John Bolton is quite a complement. Praise from Caesar is praise indeed. The only thing I’d change there is replacing the wishy-washy “a” in the last sentence; “the central part of his job” is far more accurate. Because while Biddle is correct that balancing domestic politics and military strategy is explicitly a part of the President’s job, he’s being naive in a sixth-grade-government-class kind of way when he goes on to talk about Congress defunding a war:
Waging war requires resources — money, troops, and equipment — and in a democracy, resources require public support. In the United States, the people’s representatives in Congress control public spending. If a majority of lawmakers vote against the war, it will be defunded, and this means failure every bit as much as if U.S. soldiers were outfought on the battlefield. A necessary part of any sound strategy is thus its ability to sustain the political majority needed to keep it funded, and it’s the president’s job to ensure that any strategy the country adopts can meet this requirement.
In our present political climate, it’s basically impossible to see any Congress, Red or Blue, ever ending a war by cutting off the funding. The proof is Iraq. A war that was begun under completely false pretenses, went disastrously wrong almost immediately (the insurgency was well underway in the summer of 2003), and had become crushingly unpopular by 2005, was, nevertheless, granted every dime and dollar the Pentagon requested. Even after the 2006 election, when the political unpopularity of the war was validated massively at the ballot box, the movement to defund the war never got any traction. Had 2008 gone the other way, is there any doubt that Congress would still be supinely voting for whatever the McCain Administration wanted in terms of funds to continue the adventure? You couldn’t script a more unjustified, unpopular, or unwinnable war, and Congress never closed the purse.
When it comes to war making, Congress has effectively surrendered its powers (for a lot of reasons). That is an extremely dangerous thing, and not only because the Constitution explicitly grants those powers exclusively to Congress. In the here and now, it means that the military has no means of redress if it is asked to do the impossible.
In the original formulation, Congress decided whom to fight, and the President fought them. If the President thinks it can’t be done, or requires more resources than Congress is willing to provide, then he has a lot of ways to push back against Congress. Nowadays, the President decides both whom to fight and how to fight them, Congress meekly agrees, and the military gets caught in the squeeze when things go wrong. The military needs civilians in positions of authority to treat war responsibly, and when Congress abdicates that job to the President, the military is stuck taking orders from a man who is asking it to do things it cannot do. First it was Bush the Younger in Iraq and Afghanistan, now it’s Obama in Afghanistan.
From a civilian-military point of view, it is troubling to hear that the President has become frustrated that the brass keeps saying “but, but, but” when he tells them what he wants in Afghanistan. They’re only supposed to say “yes” and “no”. But he’s asking them to do things that cannot be done, at least not without massive and unsupportable increases in men and materiel. Afghanistan might not be “winnable” even if we reinstituted the draft, raised everyone’s taxes, and sent in a million troops. Does anyone seriously believe that if Obama had agreed to 40,000 more troops instead of 30,000 last year that things would be any different right now? That’s a difference of less than 0.04 G.I.s per square mile, of one extra soldier per 3,000 Afghanis.
The commander in chief, under enormous political pressure from all sides, is telling the military to do something they likely know cannot be done. But the military isn’t big on saying things can’t be done, in no small part because there’s always someone else willing to say that it can. In theory, Congress would be able to pressure the President to either go all in or get out. After all, the military is asking for more troops and funds while the public has already turned on the war. Opinion polls have been running in the high fifties against the war for more than a year. But Congress hides behind the President, too fractured and tepid to force a decision and content to let him take the blame for a war less and less Americans want. Confronting the commander in chief, despite that being the very reason we have a Congress, would be seen as unseemly and unpatriotic.
The failure here is civilian, not military. Our juvenile, gossip obsessed political discourse and the (mostly) cowardly politicians* caught in its flow are unable to admit that things might not go our way. That it might be time to call the entire operation off. Instead of facing up to that unpleasant but increasingly undeniable concept, we’re asking the military to keep at it for a few more years, to give the public and the media and the government a decent interval in which to calm down and look the other way. Pushback from the military is unseemly and unsettling, but it would also be unnecessary if the Congress and the President were willing to act like adults and pull their heads out of the sand.
*Just as there are two parties, there are two kinds of cowardice. Most of the Blues are terrified of being called pussies for wanting to end the war while there are still “bad guys” left alive (whatever that means). All of the Reds (with the possible exception of Rand Paul) are terrified of admitting that wars are not free, and most of them would never let their kids anywhere near a recruiting station.